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Abstract: The author of this paper was appointed by the Government of 
Rajasthan state in India to design Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) at 
district level. The assignment was to submit an implementable practical report 
of district level EOCs design for equipment, personnel and training. This paper 
describes the process used for this design. A list of priority equipment, staffing 
pattern and specific training programmes were suggested. On the basis of the 
recommendations, EOCs have been set up in all the 33 districts of Rajasthan. 
The case study of the explosion at the Indian Oil Corporation’s Jaipur depot 
illustrates the use of alternative field EOC in responding to the explosion and 
the relevance of the EOC consultant’s recommendations in responding to the 
disasters. The objectives of this paper are to share the experiences of designing 
EOCs in a developing country, and the methods of optimisation for meeting 
objectives under resource constraints. 
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1 Introduction 
The Indian Famine Commission of 1878 probably gave the first famine relief 
management system in the world. Over the years, India has documented and developed a 
well-established relief system after famine and drought. The system was further 
developed for providing relief after sudden onset disasters, and not only creeping 
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disasters. However, there is a paradigm shift from post-disaster relief to pre-disaster 
prevention, preparedness and mitigation in recent times internationally, and particularly 
in India. Therefore, the State Government of Rajasthan, in India, appointed the author of 
this paper as a consultant to design an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) at the district 
level in February 2007. The consultant submitted his report in May 2007. The 
recommendations in the consultant’s report were accepted and district level EOCs are 
established in all the 33 districts of Rajasthan. 
This paper is intended to share the experiences and ‘best practices’ of the resulting 
effort in design and implementation of EOCs under resource constrains. It is hoped that 
the paper will benefit other countries and individual states or provinces within them that 
are planning to establish EOCs. 
The paper starts with the genesis of the idea of having district EOCs, and then 
proceeds with situation analysis, sources of information, thesis, methods/process, 
recommendations for setting up district EOCs and implementation. The IOC case study is 
covered in the sections of IOC and its Jaipur depot, fire explosion and its causes, damage 
due to fire explosion, response to the explosion and the role of the alternative field EOC. 
The paper ends with discussion, limitations and conclusion. 
2 Design of district EOCs 
2.1 Genesis 
The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) of India was set up under the 
Disaster Management Act of 2005. NDMA is the apex body for disaster management 
headed by the Prime Minister and has the responsibility for laying down policies, plans 
and guidelines for disaster management. To facilitate capacity building, training 
community stakeholders, conducting research, documentation and a national repository 
of information, the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) was created. The 
NIDM, in partnership with other research institutions, works within the framework of 
broad policies and guidelines laid down by the NDMA (Ministry of Home Affairs, n.d.). 
There is a Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) in India for meeting the expenditure for 
providing immediate relief to the victims of disasters. The Government of India 
contributes 75% of the yearly allocation to CRF and the balance is met by the respective 
state governments. A total of Rs. 110 billion (nearly US$ 2.2 billion) was provided for 
the CRF for the five financial years from 2000–2001 to 2004–2005 (National Disaster 
Management Division, 2003, p.72). It is not known how much was provided during the 
same period for pre-disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation, but it would almost 
certainly have been miniscule, compared to post-disaster relief. 
The Government of India was persuading the state governments to set up the EOCs 
expeditiously as mandated in the Disaster Management Act of 2005 at various levels. 
The Government of India eased the norms, allowing for procurement of essential search, 
rescue and evacuation equipments including communication equipments subject to a 
ceiling of 10% from the CRF allocation of the year (National Disaster Management 
Division, 2003). The Government of Rajasthan seized this opportunity to establish the 
district level EOCs and appointed the author as a consultant. The brief given to this 
author was to prepare an actionable/implementable report on EOC design. 
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2.2 Situation analysis 
Rajasthan is the largest state in India in terms of geographical area (342,239 sq km). 77% 
of the population (57 million in 2001) of the state live in rural areas. The population 
density is 165 persons per sq km, compared to 324 per sq km for India. Rajasthan has 
been vulnerable to floods, recurrent drought and earthquakes. During the last 60 years, 
there have been only six years when some or the other part of the state did not suffer 
from a drought. 
Rajasthan is divided into seven divisions and 33 administrative districts. The 
Divisional Commissioner basically does planning, coordination and monitoring works 
with the District Collectors within his division. The Collector and District Magistrate 
(popularly called Collector) is the administrative head of a district. The District Collector 
is responsible for disaster management within the district, apart from other administrative 
functions. However, below him there was no government official who was employed 
full-time for disaster management and there were no functioning permanent EOCs in the 
districts of Rajasthan, except in the Jaipur and Hanumangarh districts. Temporary district 
EOCs were set up during monsoon season for flood control by transferring people from 
Public Works, Irrigation and other departments of the government. 
2.3 Sources of information 
Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003, p.52) studied the reconstruction of New York City’s 
EOC after 9/11, and came to the conclusion that training and preparation are fundamental 
for a resilient organisation. However, ‘creative thinking, flexibility and ability to 
improvise in newly emergent situations are vital’. The pre-existing relationships helped 
in meeting the communication challenges. 
EOCs have been in existence in the USA since the1970s as focal points for disaster 
response. According to Quarantelli (1979), the six functions that an EOC performs are 
coordination, policymaking, operations management, information gathering, public 
information and hosting visitors. Neal (2003, p.35) reviewed literature on EOCs and 
concluded that “little systematic or empirical information is available to guide their 
effective design … a systematic analysis is needed to determine how to design and 
configure effective EOCs”. He continued by saying that we need objective data to 
improve EOC design and effectiveness. “At this time we do not know what does work 
and does not” (p.38). Comparing the American and Canadian experience about the role 
of EOCs in emergency management, Scanlon (1994) confirmed that the Canadian 
experience coincided with the American regarding the problems faced by the EOCs. 
These problems included forced relocation of EOCs in the disaster impact area and lack 
of clarity in many instances as to who was managing the EOC (Quarantelli, 1978). 
Scanlon examined 19 incidents in Canada and concluded that the need for an EOC was 
being increasingly accepted in Canada. 
Review of disaster literature led to an understanding that an EOC is a pre-designated 
facility established in a community for centralised direction and coordination of the 
overall response and to support the administration during an emergency. Responding 
organisations converge at the EOC during an emergency to coordinate response, 
recovery, information gathering and resources. EOC is “a function, a place, and a 
structure” (Perry 1991, p.204). The EOC optimises communications and coordinates 
efficient resource allocation and information presentation. The facility also helps in 
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executive decision making for disaster management in all the four phases of response, 
recovery, preparedness and mitigation. Therefore, the EOC needs to have an inbuilt 
capacity of scaling up according to the requirements in case of activation. 
2.4 Thesis 
The use of EOCs in smaller jurisdictions remains sporadic, sometimes improvisational 
and poorly understood (Wenger et al., 1989). Perry (2003, p.151) noted that “EOC 
standards and use are challenges in the United Kingdom (Alexander, 2003), Europe 
(Triligia, 1996), and Australia (Emergency Management Australia, 1996)”. According to 
Perry, emergency managers do not understand the functions and structure of an EOC. 
There is hardly any literature systematically describing the creation and design of 
EOCs in either developed or developing countries. This paper aims to fill this gap in 
literature by describing the process by which district level EOCs were designed and 
created in Rajasthan. A case study of the use of EOC in the Indian Oil Corporation Jaipur 
Depot explosion is presented as an illustration. 
2.5 Methods/process 
The Principal Secretary, Disaster Management and Relief Department, Government of 
Rajasthan, sent a concept note on EOC prepared by the author of this paper to all the 
District Collectors in Rajasthan. The objective was to educate Collectors about the EOC 
and get their involvement in the design of EOC itself. A questionnaire was attached to the 
concept note, asking for the existing facilities and practices, and their suggestions in 
terms of equipment, staffing and training needs. 12 of the 33 districts returned usable 
responses. 
To understand the situation on the ground, the EOC designer conducted field visits to 
11 districts. During the field visits, group interviews were held with Collectors and 
disaster management related staff. Focus groups were held in five districts with the help 
of the Collectors. The focus group participants were Collectors, Assistant District 
Magistrates, district officials, representatives of non-profit organisations, Red Cross, 
Scouts, National Cadet Corps, Civil Defence and others involved in disaster management 
in the districts. The consultant also met Divisional Commissioner of Bikaner. 
There is a community-based trained volunteers organisation established under the 
Civil Defence Act, 1968. In 2003 they were allowed to be used for disaster management. 
This author interacted with the Civil Defence Volunteers who were undergoing the initial 
training. Discussions were also held with the Dy. Controller, Civil Defence, Jaipur; Civil 
Defence and Home Guard Instructors, and in charge of Civil Defence and/or Home 
Guard in the districts visited. The Consultant attended disaster management related video 
conference of states with the NDMA, state video conference with the District Collectors, 
and had discussions with the officials of the National Informatics Center (NIC)1 in 
Rajasthan. Meetings were also held with the Director and officials of the IT & 
Communication Department of Govt. of Rajasthan. 
The research methodology relied on primary data such as survey questionnaires,  
face-to-face interviews, focus groups, field observations, field research and case studies 
as well as secondary data such as document analysis of the relevant official files and 
internet research. 
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2.6 Recommendations for setting up district EOCs 
Based on results from the research, a consultancy report was presented to the 
Government of Rajasthan. The main recommendations are given below. 
2.6.1 The role of the district EOC 
1 The district EOC will play a key role in district disaster planning, response and 
recovery. 
2 The district EOC shall pull together people and resources to handle emergencies that 
are outside the ability of single department to handle. 
3 The district EOC is the key to managing the district’s disaster efforts through the 
centralised, coordinated efforts of government officials, response agencies and 
community volunteers by establishing priorities. 
4 The district EOC will provide a means of centralising and managing 
communications and information within the EOC, between the EOC and the Incident 
Commander in the field, and between the EOC and the public. The EOC provides 
ready access to all available information and simplifies information verification, 
evaluation and display. 
5 The EOC will have the resources and trained personnel to handle not only sudden 
catastrophe but also creeping disasters, like drought. It will help in resource 
acquisition, re-allocation and management. The EOC also provides staff continuity 
and facilitates staff changes. 
6 Regular training and exercises will be conducted by the district EOC. 
7 Documentation management will safeguard documents generated or received by the 
EOC for use after an emergency. 
8 The alternate EOC, backup power and communications equipment will ensure 
continued operations in even the worst conditions (if the main district EOC becomes 
dysfunctional or inaccessible, it would be possible to perform the emergency 
operations from the alternative EOC). 
2.6.2 Equipments recommended for EOC 
In case of activation of the EOC, the Incident Commander needs to come to the EOC. 
The Emergency Support Function coordinators also need to come to the EOC for proper 
response. Special emphasis needs to be given to communication and database 
equipments. The EOC should have a radio system, a media interface emergency 
broadcast system, a mobile communication van and mobile command centre to which 
essential function can be transferred immediately in an emergency, if necessary. In case 
of a catastrophic incident, a helicopter surveillance facility should be available. There has 
to be a seamless, robustness and inbuilt redundancy in the equipments so that in case of 
failure replacement is possible thereby increasing the reliability. A public-emergency call 
system was recommended. The EOC should have facilities to telecast/broadcast warnings  
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to the public without the intervention of the public or private controlled TV channels or 
radio stations. All district EOCs should be equipped to trigger public warning sirens. 
Runners, traditional drum beaters (Suno, suno, suno…),2 vehicle mounted public address 
system and public address systems used for namaz by mosques may also be used for 
warning. 
The use of GIS and GPS with seven vehicle tracking units is recommended for the 
state. The EOCs may be equipped to make reverse emergency calls and send SMS 
messages on the cellphones in the target areas of the district. It was recommended that 
the district alternative EOC should have at least basic minimum functionality for 
responding to disasters. The district alternate EOC for the Jaipur district and the state as a 
whole was suggested for setting up at the Center for Disaster Management, HCM 
Rajasthan Institute of Public Administration, and this could be used for training as well. 
A list of equipment with priorities was suggested for procurement in the first phase. 
2.6.3 Staffing pattern for EOC 
There was a need for standard staffing patterns in all the 33 districts of Rajasthan. The 
staffing pattern could consist of District Disaster Management Coordinator, IT & 
Communication Officer and four Dispatchers for 24 × 7 emergency call centre. The EOC 
staff could be used for preparation and updating of district disaster management plans, 
creation of databases, preparation of a history of incidents, training and related activities. 
The EOC is to be continuously used to be effective during disasters. 
2.6.4 Training of EOC personnel 
The need for training cannot be overemphasised. During a disaster the Incident 
Commander has to take decisions while generally not knowing what the needs (demands) 
are; where the resources (supplies) are and when and how the goods and services will 
arrive (logistics). When every second counts and it is a matter of life and death, disaster 
management requires one of the highest levels of professional competence. 
To start off, there is a need for training the District Collectors. The design of a 
training programme on emergency response, complete with duration and contents of each 
session for District Collectors and Additional District Magistrates, was given in the 
Consultant’s report (Khanna and Gupta, 2004). A list of the 50 most recommended books 
for graduate students in emergency management and related fields by the disaster 
researchers and emergency management faculty in the USA was included in the 
consultant’s report (Gupta, 2005). Disaster management is everybody’s business and 
many a times it is the community action which works initially. Thus, a proposal for 
training ‘Community Disaster Response Teams’ was given. 
2.7 Implementation/setting up of district EOCs 
The consultancy report on Design of EOCs at District Level by Kailash Gupta was 
accepted by the Government of Rajasthan. EOCs in all the 33 districts of Rajasthan have 
been set up. 
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2.7.1 Equipments 
Most of the equipment recommended for purchase in the first phase in the consultancy 
report were approved for purchase, and were procured. The existing state EOC was 
strengthened. Mobile command vehicles with GPS vehicle tracking unit and software 
were recommended for seven divisional headquarters. These were procured at an 
aggregate cost of Rs. 3,423,798 ($73,630) by the General Administration Department of 
the government and are being used. 
Thirty-three sets of following equipments were purchased, one set for each district: 
1 Desktop computers at Rs. 88,650 ($2429) 
2 Multifunction printers (print, scan, fax, copy) at Rs. 14,327 ($308) 
3 42” Plasma TVs with DTH at Rs. 45,625 ($981) 
4 VHF wireless sets, six numbers for each district at an aggregate cost for the 33 
districts of Rs. 2.2 million ($47,000) 
5 Digital cameras at Rs. 8850 ($190) 
6 2 KVA online UPS at Rs. 49,548 ($1066) 
7 Emergency diesel generators at Rs. 129,671 ($2789) 
8 Telephone landline and cellphone 
9 Broadband connectivity 
10 3 ISDN line with feature phone cabling/networking 
11 Dragon light and ropes 
12 Display boards for emergency contact numbers 
13 White boards. 
RajCOMP, a State Agency, established under the Department of IT&C, Government of 
Rajasthan, was assigned the task of purchase of equipment for the District EOCs. The 
equipment purchased by RajCOMP and the costs incurred are given above. The costs are 
given for indicative purposes only and vary depending on the specifications, tax structure 
and many other considerations. The purpose of giving the costs is to explain the EOCs 
could be set up even under resource constrains. The items listed above for which costs 
are not given were purchased by the District Collectors locally. 
2.7.2 Staffing pattern for EOC 
Due to the resource constrains with the government, no fresh recruitment or deployment 
of full-time dedicated staff for the EOCs was resorted to. An innovative solution was 
found to give additional duties to the District NIC Officer (please see Note 2) and make 
them responsible for the District EOC. Even the EOC equipment was placed in the 
district NIC centres. In some of the districts, one of the Additional District Magistrate 
was made in charge of the EOC. In the state capital Jaipur, the incumbent Deputy 
Controller, Civil Defence, was made District EOC Officer, in addition to his normal 
duties. 
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2.7.3 Training of EOC personnel 
Again due to the resource constraints no specialised training in disaster management or 
EOC operations was provided to the EOC staff. In absence of dedicated full-time EOC 
personnel, it becomes difficult to decide whom to train. 
3 Case study of the Indian Oil Corporation Jaipur depot explosion 
On 29 October 2009 at 7:30 pm first explosion fire started in the Indian Oil Corporation 
Ltd. (IOC) depot (or terminal) at Sitapura Industrial Area, Jaipur, that raged for 11 days, 
killing 11 people, evacuating half a million people and keeping the city in smoke for the 
duration. The explosion was equivalent to 20 tonnes of TNT, and created an earthquake 
of 2.3 on the Richter scale. Even the army was pressed into action for response (MSN 
News, 2010). An onsite temporary field EOC was set up in the office premises of 
Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. (RIICO) at 
Sitapura. This alternative field EOC was used for 11 days, the period that the fire raged. 
3.1 IOC and its Jaipur depot 
The IOC is a Government of India owned company in the field of oil and gas, 
petrochemicals, refinery, pipeline transportation and marketing. IOC turnover in 2009–
2010 was US$ 57 billion and it employed 34,363 employees (IOC, 2010). Jaipur, the 
capital city of Rajasthan and a popular tourist city, has a population of over 2.5 million. 
IOC Sitapura terminal is situated 16 km south of the city centre. Jaipur city is 260 km 
southwest of New Delhi. In the vicinity of the depot when it was set up years ago, there 
was hardly any habitation nearby. But now there is Sitapura Industrial Area adjoining the 
IOC terminal having many industrial units, educational institutions and residential areas. 
The IOC website immediately after the explosion or till now does not mention about 
the explosion, although it mentions ironically about many safety awards IOC won. The 
annual report for 2009–2010 on pages 46–47 states “An unfortunate incident of fire 
occurred in Indian Oil’s Jaipur terminal on 29th October, 2009 resulting in the loss of 
lives as well as destruction of property and products”, without giving any details. 
This author was not allowed to enter the terminal for collection of data for this paper 
by IOC, although ten months had elapsed after the fire. The General Manager of the IOC 
Rajasthan Office refused to meet me or give any information, saying that the matter is 
subjudice. In July 2010, the IOC General Manager for Rajasthan and eight of his senior 
colleagues were arrested. They were charged under Section 304A of the Indian Penal 
Code (causing death due to negligence) along with certain sections of the Petroleum Act. 
The officials have been held responsible for gross violations of norms laid down by the 
Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) (Business Standard, 2010). 
3.2 Fire explosion and its cause 
There was leakage in oil transportation which could not be contained. It was a leak that 
subsequently caused the fire and engulfed all the 11 storage tanks at the depot. First oil 
tanker explosion occurred at about 7:30 pm on Thursday, 29 October 2009. There were 
11 interconnected tankers. Due to the heat, cap of other tankers blew up and oil got burnt. 
One after the other all the tankers caught fire, which could be seen from kilometres away. 
The fire could not be contained until all the oil burnt out. 
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The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas of the Government of India appointed a 
seven member committee headed by M.B. Lal, former Chairman-cum-Managing 
Director of the Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd., to investigate the causes of the 
explosion. The committee report pointed out the ‘gross negligence’ during the transfer of 
petrol from the storage tank. “The basic or root cause is an absence of site specific 
written operating procedures, absence of leak stopping devices from a remote location 
and insufficient understanding of hazards, risks and consequences”, Lal told reporters a 
day after submitting the inquiry report to Petroleum Minister Murli Deora (Rediff, 2010). 
3.3 Damage due to fire explosion 
The fire balls kept coming and smoke engulfed the city and the surrounding areas. Many 
buildings of the nearby industries were destroyed, and the glass of buildings even 
kilometres away was broken. The petrol vapours in the atmosphere made it difficult for 
people to breath. There was death of 11 people, six of them IOC employees, three 
employees of the adjoining Genus Company (manufacturing electronic house energy 
meters and invertors), one elderly woman from Sitapura village and another unknown 
person. There is common boundary wall between IOC depot emergency exit gate and 
Genus. One employee of Genus died because the administrative building fell on him, 
while two died near the boundary wall. People died due to burns and asphyxia. Over 300 
people were injured. 
One of the persons this author interviewed was living very near to the depot. 
Although most of the people and his family members evacuated on 29 October, he and 
another neighbour stayed put throughout the night outside their home. He said it was too 
hot and every three minutes he was feeling thirsty and was drinking water. Due to the 
intense odour, even breathing was difficult. There was carbon layer in the morning all 
around. Small iron pieces of tankers were found all around. 
3.4 Response to the explosion 
Administration, police, fire brigade, ambulance, army, civil defence volunteers and other 
services were immediately deployed for response. All the hospitals, government and 
private, were put on high alert, and injured were taken to the nearest hospitals. The 5 km 
radius area from the depot was cordoned off and declared ‘danger zone’. All movements 
in the danger zone were restricted, including the nearby railway movement. Half a 
million people were evacuated. The electricity to the danger zone was intentionally 
disconnected immediately to avoid any untoward incidents. 
The technical matter of containment of fire was discussed by the fire officials with 
the IOC officials. Technical experts of IOC also came from Mumbai. However, they did 
not have any solution to stop burning of oil tankers till all the oil got burnt out. An 
attempt was made to prevent the fire from spreading out. On the west side of the IOC 
depot, on the other side of the highway there is depot of Bharat Petroleum Corporation. 
Luckily the wind direction itself prevented the fire from going toward that side. 
Firefighting trucks were called from adjoining cities and were placed all around the 
cordoned off declared danger zone. In some places trenches five feet wide and deep were 
dug and filled with water to prevent fire from spreading. 
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3.5 Role of the alternative field EOC 
RIICO is a state government catalyst agency employing 1054 persons for industrial 
development (RIICO, 2010). Its office in Sitapura Industrial Area, near the IOC Depot, 
was visited by the administration officers in the night of 29 October itself. The office 
building has four big rooms in the second floor which were and still are empty. The 
ground level has offices with computer, telephone, fax, copiers and other facilities. The 
RIICO office was used as a field EOC for response to the fire explosion for the 11-day 
duration till the fire raged. The Jaipur district disaster officials, fire brigade, police, 
ambulance, civil defence and other responding organisation officials used the facility for 
coordination and meeting. 
4 Discussion 
Some of the equipment has been purchased and delivered to the respective districts for 
setting up EOCs. However, in some districts, the equipments have not been installed. 
VHF Wireless sets were not operative, pending allocation of frequency by the Wireless 
Planning and Communications wing of the Government of India. 
The IOC explosion clearly brings forth the relevance of the consultant’s 
recommendations about disaster response and role of the EOC. For example, there is no 
siren warning system in Jaipur. This is another matter that the loud explosion sound, 
explosion-triggered earthquake, fireballs visibility from kilometres, smoke and odour 
themselves served as warnings. The incident also explains the importance of mobile 
communication and command centre to function as field EOC. VHF Wireless system of 
the EOC would have been useful. The existing wireless system connects only the 
Collector with the senior police officers. 
The explosion incident also supports the recommendation for the employment of the 
full-time dedicated district disaster management team. The training of the District 
Collectors and other officials in disaster management is also essential. 
One of the District Collectors, who does not want to be identified, said “The EOC is 
ill equipped and is not functional. There are no resources. The EOC requires dedicated 
professional disaster manager. Disaster management is a specialized discipline, and 
generalists cannot do disaster management. The staff who are presently assigned to the 
EOC have no disaster management expertise”. 
Without proper staff and training, any amount of sophisticated equipment would be 
useless. Therefore, the Government of Rajasthan should seriously consider appointing 
permanent staff at the district EOCs and their training. 
5 Limitations 
I did not face any major challenges or limitations in conducting the EOC study. The 
officials at the State Government, District Collectors and others were very helpful. The 
only limitation and challenge appears to be lack of understanding and knowledge about 
the disaster management in general and the functioning of EOC in particular. My 
findings confirm Perry’s (2003, p.151) findings that emergency managers do not 
understand the functions and structure of an EOC. 
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As already stated, the IOC did not cooperate in giving any information for research of 
this paper. The Jaipur District Collector and the district disaster officer did provide the 
relevant information. 
6 Conclusions 
On the basis of my recommendations, EOCs in all the 33 districts of Rajasthan were set 
up by procuring equipment. A comparative study of setting up EOCs in other states of 
India and even in other developing countries would be of interest. A properly functioning 
EOC in disaster response is important to save lives, property and environment during and 
after a disaster. This paper is expected to help in better understanding of issues involved 
in design of EOCs under resource constrains for the benefit of administrators, 
emergency/disaster managers, researchers and students. The IOC explosion explains the 
importance of equipping district EOC, alternative EOC, full-time dedicated team of 
disaster management officials and proper disaster management training. 
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Notes 
1 National Informatics Centre (NIC) is the premiere Science and Technology institution of the 
Government of India, for providing e-Government/e-Governance solutions adopting best 
practices, integrated services and global solutions in government sector. 
2 Traditional drum beaters attracting the attention of citizenry used to go around the town for 
making public announcements in India. They would shout suno, suno, suno in Hindi language, 
which means listen, listen, listen. Subsequently when people are gathered, they would make 
the public announcement. 
